Checkmark for safety

One of the fundamental elements of well performing accident prevention programs and well developed safety cultures is effective hazard recognition. If employees are not trained to recognize the risks that they are exposed to, they will never be able to effectively prevent accidents. Honing and developing hazard recognition skills can be achieved in many ways. Experience is the best teacher, and hands-on training with a person skilled in that position is a very effective method of instruction. Experienced employees as well as novices also can benefit greatly by using some simple hazard recognition tools. One of these common tools is the job safety analysis (JSA).

The JSA can go by many different names and acronyms, and the safety profession seems to add to these on what almost seems like a daily basis. Some examples of these are:

• job hazard analysis (JHA);
• pretask analysis (PTA);
• task safety analysis (TSA);
• safety task analysis card (STAC);
• activity hazard analysis (AHA); and
• task hazard analysis (THA).

While many will argue there are benefits to one versus the others, the subtle differences that exist between the various tools, besides the name and acronyms, all boil down to the fundamental principal that all of these tools are used for: to identify the hazards and risks associated with tasks, and to develop and implement a plan to mitigate the hazards before the employee is exposed to hazards using the hierarchy of controls.

Once the hazard is identified, the employee will either: remove the hazard, engineer out the hazard, control the hazard administratively or use personal protective equipment (PPE) as a last resort to control exposure to the hazard. One of the overlooked options at the employee’s disposal is to use his or her “stop work authority” and not to perform the task at all due to safety concerns. Using the JSA as a go-no go tool can identify work plan flaws before an accident occurs.
 

Breaking it down

The JSA should not be a summary of the site health and safety plan (HASP). It should be based on discreet definable tasks. For example the task of “demolition of the building” will be too broad in its scope for the use as a task in a JSA. What you need to do is break down the steps in the demolition of that building. One task may be “torch cut equipment and piping from building.” A second task may be “remove debris and material with a skid steer” and a third may be “remove structure with excavator.” All three of these tasks have unique hazards associated with their work that need to be identified and controlled. Let’s take a look at how the JSA process would work with a task.

Forms are commercially available to be filled out either by hand or electronically to print. An Internet search would yield many options. Apps also are available for phones and tablets. Some are free and some are for purchase that will help to guide you through the process. You can even go old school and create your own with a spreadsheet program or a sheet of paper and a pen or pencil.

Once you have identified the unique tasks, each task needs to be broken down into a step-by-step list of activities that make up the task. The tasks identified will be put in the first column of your form. If, for example, you use the “torch cut equipment and piping from building” task, you will develop a list of steps that are used to perform the task. The first step would be to inspect the area for combustible materials. Step two would include filling out a hot work permit, if required. Third would involve inspecting the torch, hoses and compressed gas bottles to ensure that they are in proper working order with no obvious defects. Step four: light the torch; step five: cut materials with torch; step six: turn off torch, step seven: clean up.

This is the generic set of steps used; there may be a few additional in your application. Company standard operating procedures (SOP) also may be included. For example your torch inspection procedure may be one that would apply in this example. Many of you may be thinking, “This won’t work in the real world. It will take me longer to go through this process than it will to do the job.” The first few times you go through this process it will indeed take a little time, but that is the whole point. We need to spend the time to identify the hazards associated with the work so we can reduce or prevent the possibility of an accident. Once this process is used a few times it will become more comfortable to apply for the users and give them confidence in their ability to control hazards they face and to eliminate preventable accidents.
 

Hazard identification

The second step in the JSA process is the identification of the hazards associated with each step. These findings are usually recorded in a second column. This is the most important part of the process because as mentioned before, if the hazards are not identified, preventative measures cannot be applied. A critical part of this step is field verification of hazards. Many companies will put out generic JSAs for employees to follow but fail to field verify conditions with the personnel who are actually performing the work. The field personnel bring great insight to work practices and many times during this process it is found that what the original JSA writer identified as a hazard is not really there and an adjustment must be made in the field to mitigate the actual hazards.

The step-by-step hazards would look something like this:

Step one: inspect the area for combustible materials. If you are walking around you will need to watch out for slips, trips and falls while you are conducting your inspection. You also may need to conduct air monitoring to verify that there is no combustible or flammable material in the atmosphere of the area where you are planning to use a torch. You will look for nonstandard things that can burn such as liquids, pipe residuals, combustible metals, flammable dust, etc., and eliminate them from the work area if possible.

Step two: complete hot work permit; you will identify fire protection equipment, escape routes, emergency contact numbers and fire watch personnel.

Step three: inspect the torch equipment. Verify that the torch has flashback arrestors and reverse flow check valves. All connections are leak free. The torch hose has no leaks, cuts or obvious weak points. All valves open and close properly both at the torch and at the bottles. The torch tip is not clogged and is in acceptable condition.

Step four: lighting the torch. The most obvious hazard would be the potential for burns but also the potential for back flash.

The next step in the process would be the torch cutting itself. The hazards include fire, thermal burns, exposure to lead from painted surfaces, other health exposures from contaminants that have built up outside the equipment or pipes as well as any residuals from the inside of the equipment or pipes. You would continue with the identification process for the remaining steps progressively. As you can see, the need for field verification is crucial to identifying hazards and possible unsafe scenarios due to the work.
 

Mitigation factors

In a third column of your form, you will list the mitigation or control for all of the identified hazards. You must be sure to use the hierarchy of controls when listing the mitigation factors. In step one, you will remove all combustibles or protect them by covering them with fireproof materials such as a fire blanket. Another engineering method that could be used would be wetting down the entire area to prevent wood and paper from catching fire. However, the use of water could cause other hazards such as contact with electrical systems. Be careful that your controls don’t cause new hazards that are not identified.

What you don’t want to write in the control factors is to “be careful” or “burn with care” as these are not positive measurable acts. These are good behaviors but not effective positive controls. All controls need to be able to be tangible and measured for effectiveness.

Many of the steps may not be able to be positively controlled and may require specific PPE. Remember, based on the hierarchy of controls PPE is the last resort for a control. PPE is the only thing between the employee and the hazard. All PPE choices should be reviewed by a safety professional to ensure proper equipment is being used and its application is in the proper context.

Another consideration for an effective JSA is its length. If your JSA is more than two pages you should do additional evaluation as to whether the task can be broken down into a smaller subset. The more concise a JSA is the more effective it will be and the more effective it will be in identifying all hazards.

Many JSAs and their previously mentioned variations may include several other elements. A list of minimum PPE that may be required to perform the work and persons responsible for controls listed on the JSA are examples. Tools to measure risk by evaluating likelihood and severity of a hazard to assess stop work conditions also may be included. Spend some time evaluating what method works best for your individual operation and level of exposure.

In the end whatever the name used or the features contained in the JSA program, it is important to remember that the JSA is a tool and not a magic wand. A tool is only as effective as the skill level of the person using the tool. With practice and experience, the tool will produce effective results and your accident prevention program and safety culture will improve. Prevention starts with hazard identification and a properly applied JSA process will identify hazards associated with your specific work tasks.

Michael J. Casbon is a technical director for Environmental Resources Management (ERM), a member of the ANSI/ASSE A10.6 committee, former director of the National Demolition Association and member of the association’s Employee Health & Safety Committee.